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FIRST, DO NO HARM: TORT LIABILITY, 
REGULATION AND THE FORCED 
REPATRIATION OF UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS 
Daniel J. Procaccini*
Abstract: In Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical Center, a jury found that 
it was not unreasonable for a hospital to return a traumatically injured, 
undocumented immigrant to his native country against the will of his 
guardian. Also known as forced repatriation, the practice of inter-
national patient dumping results from the disjointed federal regulations 
governing the intersection of immigration and health care law. This 
Comment examines the underlying causes of forced repatriation and 
whether tort liability is a suitable means for preventing this practice. It 
concludes that direct regulation, rather than tort law, is a preferable 
method of preventing this harm and calls upon Congress to adopt uniform 
regulations regarding the medical transfer of all patients to foreign 
hospitals, regardless of their immigration status. 
Introduction 
 When is it acceptable to terminate medical care for a severely in-
jured non-citizen?1 On July 27, 2009, a Florida jury answered that ques-
tion when it found that it was not unreasonable for a hospital to stop 
providing medical care and send a traumatically brain-injured patient 
back to Guatemala against the wishes of his guardian.2 This verdict ex-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 See Florida Hospital Flies Patient to Guatemala; Courts to Address Care of Non-U.S. Citizens, 
12 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Jul. 17, 2003) (quoting a hospital association vice 
president stating repatriation represents the “financial and ethical dilemma . . . . When 
does care stop?”). 
2 See Jury Verdict at 1, Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., No. 04000715CA, 2009 WL 
3260347 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 27, 2009); Deborah Sontag, Jury Rules for Hospital That Deported 
Patient, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2009, at A10. Montejo’s lawsuit took a serpentine path through 
Florida’s judiciary. See, e.g., Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr. (Montejo II ), 935 So. 2d 
1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr. (Montejo I ), 874 
So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). First, in 2003, Martin Memorial sought and re-
ceived a court order authorizing Luis Jimenez’s repatriation. See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 
656. In 2004, a Florida District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court order on federal 
preemption grounds. Id. at 658. In 2006, on the issues of immunity and standing, the case 
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posed to scrutiny the “rare but widespread” practice of forced medical 
repatriation—or international patient dumping.3
 The facts of Luis Jimenez’s experience illuminate the grave nature 
of this dilemma.4 Late in the afternoon on February 28, 2000, an am-
bulance hastened Luis Jimenez—a catastrophically injured accident 
victim—to Martin Memorial Medical Center, a community hospital in 
“upscale” Stuart, Florida.5 He was injured in a head-on collision with a 
drunken driver operating a stolen van.6 When the ambulance arrived 
at the hospital, Mr. Jimenez was unconscious and in shock; his injuries 
included extensive bleeding, three broken limbs, multiple internal in-
juries, and severe head trauma.7 His prognosis was “poor.”8 Despite his 
condition, Martin Memorial’s staff was able to provide extensive medi-
cal treatment to Mr. Jimenez, and he stabilized.9 Nevertheless, Mr. 
Jimenez deteriorated and was readmitted to the hospital in January 
2001.10 The hospital subsequently determined that he should be 
                                                                                                                      
returned to the Florida District Court of Appeals. See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1268. The 
Court found in favor of Montejo and remanded for the limited purpose of determining 
whether the hospital’s conduct was reasonable. See id. at 1272. 
3 See Sontag, supra note 2. Accurately framing this issue is a challenge because “[t]he 
terms ‘medical deportation’ and ‘medical repatriation’ often have been used interchangea-
bly by the press and public when discussing this issue.” Joseph Wolpin, Recent Development, 
Medical Repatriation of Alien Patients, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 152, 155 n.1 (2009). “Deportation” 
has a specific meaning in immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006); Ballentine’s Law 
Dictionary 337 (3d ed. 1969). Additionally, the term “forced” is somewhat ambiguous. See 
Wolpin, supra at 153. This Comment adopts the term “repatriation” denoting “to restore or 
return to one’s country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship.” Webster’s Third New Inter-
national Dictionary of the English Language 1924 (Phillip Babcock Grove ed., 1986). 
The phrase “forced repatriation” shall encompass the circumstances relevant here, where the 
transfer was made without consent from the patient or his or her guardian. See Wolpin, supra 
at 153. 
4 See generally Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267–68; Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 656; Deborah 
Sontag, Deported, by U.S. Hospitals: Immigrants, Spurned on Rehabilitation, Are Forced out, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 3, 2008, at A1. 
5 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
6 See id. The blood alcohol level of the driver was four times the legal limit. See id. Two 
of the four passengers in the vehicle were killed. See id. The driver eventually pled guilty to 
D.U.I. manslaughter, D.U.I. injury, and grand theft auto. See id. The driver, however, was 
uninsured. See id. The victims’ families subsequently filed an unsuccessful lawsuit against 
an irrigation company arguing that its employees had enabled the accident by leaving 
their keys in an unattended van. See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 656; Sontag, supra note 4. Mr. Jimenez was “emaciated 
and suffering from ulcerous bedsores so deep that the tendons behind his knees were 
exposed.” Sontag, supra note 4. 
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treated in a traumatic brain rehabilitation facility.11 Mr. Jimenez, how-
ever, was an uninsured, undocumented immigrant, meaning that long-
term care would be difficult—if not impossible—to arrange.12
 The regulations governing the intersection of immigration and 
health care law are a “patchwork of illogical policies” which not only 
victimizes critically injured patients, but also unfairly burdens health 
care providers.13 Medicare-participating hospitals like Martin Memorial 
are required by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act (EMTALA) to provide appropriate medical screening and neces-
sary stabilizing treatment to any individual who enters an emergency 
department.14 Additionally, Medicare’s Conditions of Participation re-
quire that hospitals transfer patients in need of post-hospital care to an 
appropriate facility capable of meeting the patient’s medical needs.15 
The Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996, however, terminated undocumented immi-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 657. 
12 See id. at 656; Sontag, supra note 4. Although uninsured and illegal, Mr. Jimenez was 
working in the United States. See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 655; Sontag, supra note 4. 
“[T]here is no consensus on what to call people who work in the United States in contra-
vention of immigration laws.” Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: 
Reconsidering U.S. Laws That Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 
571, 573 (2004). In her article, Professor Lyons argues for the adoption of set terminology 
that appropriately reflects the different groups of people illegally working in the United 
States. See id. at 573−82. “[I]mmigrants who are unauthorized to work are not all undocu-
mented and those who are undocumented did not all enter the country illegally.” Id. at 
582. Moreover, the term “illegal alien” is “racially loaded, ambiguous, imprecise, and pejo-
rative.” Id. at 576 (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Comment uses the term “undocu-
mented immigrant” to refer to any individual “who presently possess[es] no proof of any 
right to be present in the United States, whether or not [he or she has] been declared 
deportable by the U.S. government(and the vast majority have not).” See id. at 581. 
13 See Adrianne Ortega, Note, . . . And Health Care for All: Immigrants in the Shadow of the 
Promise of Universal Health Care, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 185, 185–90, 195–96 (2009). In her 
Note, Ortega comprehensively describes the substance of the laws governing health care 
for immigrants and concludes that cash-strapped hospitals treating undocumented immi-
grants often resort to tactics like repatriation. See id. at 196; see also Ryan Knutson, Note, 
Deprivation of Care: Are Federal Laws Restricting the Provision of Medical Care to Immigrants Work-
ing as Planned?, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 401, 404 (2008) (“[M]edical providers are also 
struggling under the general prohibition on providing preventative care to immigrants.”). 
14 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(i) 
(2006). Although hospitals could theoretically opt out of federal funding and be relieved 
of the burden of emergency care, most hospitals are in no position to do so. See Knutson, 
supra note 13, at 405 n.27. 
15 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d) (2008); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to 
Conditions of Participation of Hospitals, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,414, 64,149 (Dec. 13, 1994) (pro-
viding the official comment as to what appropriate medical facility means). 
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grants’ eligibility for non-emergency health care benefits.16 Without 
insurance coverage, no qualified nursing facility would accept Mr. 
Jimenez as a patient.17 As a result, Martin Memorial provided uncom-
pensated treatment for more than two years at a cost of over one mil-
lion dollars.18
  Montejo Gaspar Montejo, Mr. Jimenez’s cousin and legal guard-
ian, argued that it was the hospital’s responsibility to provide his cousin 
with the rehabilitation he required.19 Martin Memorial “declined to 
take out [its] checkbook” to pay for his care in another facility.20 Hav-
ing reached an impasse, Martin Memorial sought and received the ap-
proval of a Florida trial court to privately return Luis Jimenez to Gua-
temala.21 On June 27, 2003, sometime before 7:00 A.M., the hospital 
took Mr. Jimenez to the airport and flew him by private plane back to 
his native country without consent from or notice to his guardian.22 
“We went to see him at the hospital,” Montejo told a reporter for the 
The New York Times, “and his bed was empty.”23 Since arriving in Guate-
mala, Mr. Jimenez has received no further medical care and his condi-
tion has continued to deteriorate.24 Left without any viable alternative, 
Montejo filed a lawsuit against Martin Memorial for false imprison-
ment, or “what he essentially saw as the hospital’s kidnapping and de-
                                                                                                                      
16 See Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, §§ 401(a), 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2261, 2274 (1996) (codified 
at scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
17 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 657. EMTALA provides “a participating hospital that has 
specialized capabilities or facilities . . . shall not refuse to accept an appropriate transfer . . . 
if the hospital has the capacity to the treat the individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g). Interest-
ingly, when the hospital inquired about transferring Mr. Jimenez to various Florida facili-
ties, the typical response was simply “unable to take patient.” See Sontag, supra note 4. 
18 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 656. The hospital was reimbursed for about $80,000 with 
emergency Medicare funds. See id. An average stay at Martin Memorial lasts 4.1 days and 
costs $8188. See Sontag, supra note 4. 
19 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 656; Sontag, supra note 4. 
20 See Sontag, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267; Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 657. Martin Memorial ar-
gued that Montejo was not acting in Mr. Jimenez’s best interest. See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 
1267. This argument was predicated on a letter from a Guatemalan health official suggest-
ing Mr. Jimenez could receive all necessary care at an orthopedic hospital in his native 
country. See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 657. The hospital to which the letter alluded was de-
scribed as “the asylum wing of an orthopedic hospital . . . . [t]hat’s much like a homeless 
shelter in Guatemala, where people who can’t take care of their relatives leave them.” See 
Douglas, supra note 1, at 1130 (quoting JoNel Newman, a legal services attorney represent-
ing Montejo). The letter was subsequently found to be both inadmissible hearsay and in-
sufficient evidence of proper discharge. See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 658. 
22 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1268; Sontag, supra note 4. 
23 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
24 See id. 
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portation of his profoundly disabled cousin.”25 The all-white Florida 
jury disagreed with Montejo and found for the hospital.26
 This Comment examines whether forced repatriation should be 
addressed through tort law, Montejo’s approach, or through some 
other means. Part I examines the socioeconomic and legal barriers be-
tween undocumented immigrants and health insurance in the United 
States. Part II analyzes a hospital’s obligation to provide medical care 
under EMTALA and Medicaid. This section also assesses the relation-
ship between those obligations and the forced repatriation of undocu-
mented immigrants. Part III discusses the merits of tort law as a solu-
tion to this problem and compares it to the alternative approach of 
direct regulation. Finally, this comment concludes that tort law, in light 
of its traditional functions and purposes, is an inadequate solution and 
urges Congress to adopt unambiguous regulations governing the dis-
charge and transfer of all patients. Undocumented immigrants are not 
“beasts of burden that can be dumped over the border when [they] 
have outlived [their] usefulness.”27 Rather, the law governing the provi-
sion of health care for undocumented immigrants should reflect West-
ern medicine’s most honored maxim: “First, do no harm.”28
I. Undocumented in America: Uninsured and Unprotected 
 The United States is a nation of immigrants.29 Since the 1970s, the 
proportion of immigrants to U.S. residents has steadily increased.30 In 
2007, one in eight U.S. residents was an immigrant.31 As of early 2009, 
the Department of Homeland Security estimated that roughly thirty 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1268; Sontag, supra note 2. 
26 See Jury Verdict, supra note 2, at 1; Sontag, supra note 2. 
27 Deborah Sontag, Deported in a Coma, Saved Back in U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2008, at 
A1 (quoting a legal immigrant who was repatriated by an Arizona hospital). 
28 See Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The Consequences of Overriding Professional 
Ethics, 6 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 351, 376 (2006) (examining this maxim’s myste-
rious history); Wolpin, supra note 3, at 155. 
29 See Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 865, 871 
(2008) (“All Americans, with the possible exception of Native Americans, are immigrants 
or the descendants of immigrants.”). Professor Schuck suggests that Americans proudly 
identify themselves as descended from immigrants, and explains that this sentiment is 
often invoked against proponents of restrictive immigration policy. See id. at 871−72. 
30 Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of 
America’s Foreign-Born Population 1 (2007), avaliable at http://www.cis.org/articles/ 
2007/back1007.pdf. 
31 See id. 
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percent of the foreign-born resident population was undocumented.32 
The large and rapidly growing undocumented immigrant population 
suffers from a chronic lack of health insurance.33 Uninsured, undocu-
mented patients like Luis Jimenez are the most susceptible to the prac-
tice of forced repatriation because socioeconomic conditions, in con-
junction with restrictive federal regulations, effectively preclude this 
class of residents from obtaining health care coverage.34
A. Poverty and Poor Education: A Recipe for the Uninsured 
 The story of Luis Jimenez illustrates many of the typical qualities of 
an undocumented immigrant in the United States.35 His journey was 
propelled by the dream of earning a living to support his family in Gua-
temala.36 Indeed, most undocumented immigrants journey to America 
seeking employment.37 Just over half are high school graduates.38 Their 
limited educational experience is associated with a disproportionate 
concentration in low-wage jobs such as farming, groundskeeping, con-
struction, and the food service industry.39 At the time of his accident, 
Mr. Jimenez was working as a landscaper in Florida.40 Despite being 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Michael Hoffer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigra-
tion Statistics, Policy Directorate, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2009, at 3 (2010). The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security estimated that at the beginning of 2009 over thirty-one million 
people in the United States were foreign born. See id. The 2009 and 2008 estimates of un-
documented immigrants mark the first year-to-year decreases since 2005. See id. at 1. At 
least one study concludes that the decline was due to both increased enforcement of im-
migration laws and economic decline. See Steven A. Camarota & Karen Jensenius, 
Homeward Bound: Recent Immigration Enforcement and the Decline in the Illegal 
Alien Population 9 (2008), avaliable at http://www.cis.org/articles/2008/back808.pdf. 
33 See Dana P. Goldman et al., Legal Status and Health Insurance Among Immigrants, 24 
Health Aff. 1640, 1640, 1651 (2005). 
34 See id. at 1644, 1649; Ortega, supra note 13, at 186–87. 
35 See generally Jeffery S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Portrait of 
Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, at i–v (2009), http://pewhispanic. 
org/files/reports/107.pdf; Sontag, supra note 4. 
36 See Sontag, supra note 4. While residing in Guatemala, Mr. Jimenez and his wife sup-
ported their family on an income of about six dollars per day. See id. 
37 See Marc L. Berk et al., Health Care Use Among Undocumented Latino Immigrants, 19 
Health Aff. 51, 56 (2000) (describing a sampling of four Latino populations, the majority 
of whom said work was the primary reason for immigrating to the United States). 
38 See Passel & Cohn, supra note 35, at iv. An estimated forty-seven percent of undocu-
mented immigrants ages twenty-five to sixty-four have less than a high school education, 
compared to only eight percent of U.S. residents in the same age range. See id. Ironically, the 
younger the age of arrival of an undocumented immigrant into the United States, the greater 
his or her chances of attending college. See id. at 14. 
39 See id. at 15–16. 
40 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
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employed, he was indigent and unable to afford medical care or insur-
ance.41 Twenty-one percent of adult, undocumented immigrants live in 
poverty—more than double the rate for U.S.-born adults.42 Along with 
their U.S.-born children, undocumented immigrants account for 
eleven percent of those living below the poverty level, which is more 
than twice their representation in the U.S. population.43
 Indigent immigrants with low wage jobs fair poorly in a health care 
system reliant on employer-provided health insurance.44 In 2005, ap-
proximately 68% of undocumented immigrants lacked health insur-
ance.45 With a median income of only $36,000, most cannot afford to 
purchase their own health care plans.46 Undocumented immigrants 
overwhelmingly work in the construction, food service, and hospitality 
industries.47 These types of employers are unlikely to provide health 
care benefits to their employees.48 The owner of the landscaping ser-
vice employing Mr. Jimenez did not.49 Practically speaking, the door to 
private insurance is firmly closed on the undocumented.50
B. PRWORA: The Barrier to Public Benefit Programs 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Professional Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).51 PRWORA was intended 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
42 See Passel & Cohn, supra note 35, at 17. 
43 See id. 
44 John C. Alker, Kaiser Family Found., The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, Immigrants and Health Coverage: A Primer (2004), http://www.kff. 
org/uninsured/upload/7088.pdf. In 2010, the U.S. Congress  passed health care reform 
legislation that could have addressed this disparity. See Health Care Reform, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com (follow “Health” hyperlink; then follow “Tracking the 
Overhaul” hyperlink) (providing a comprehensive summary of the health care overhaul 
debate). Undocumented immigrants, however, were explicitly excluded from this legisla-
tion. See Juliana Barbassa, Health Care Reform Ignores Illegal Immigrants, TIME, Apr. 4, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1977692,00.html. 
45 See Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 1645. 
46 See Passel & Cohn, supra note 35, at 16–18. In 2009, the average cost of a family 
health insurance policy was $13,375. See Drew Altman, Kaiser Family Found., “Pulling It 
Together . . .”: Simple Arithmetic, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.kff.org/pull- 
ingittogether (follow “Simple Arithmetic” hyperlink). 
47 See Alker, supra note 44; Passel & Cohn, supra note 35, at 4. 
48 See Alker, supra note 44. 
49 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267 (stating that Mr. Jimenez was indigent and did not 
qualify for Medicaid); Alker, supra note 44; Passel & Cohn, supra note 35, at 14. 
50 See Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 1645 (finding that virtually no undocumented 
immigrants purchase private health insurance and very few had employer-based coverage). 
51 See Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1646 (2006)). 
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to deter immigration to the United States by encouraging self-
reliance.52 It attempted to further this goal by reducing immigrants’ 
access to public benefit programs.53 The Act excludes virtually all un-
documented immigrants from its definition of “qualified aliens” who 
are able to access services.54 Accordingly, most undocumented immi-
grants cannot receive compensated medical care under Medicare or 
Medicaid.55 Because Mr. Jimenez was excluded from Medicare coverage 
by PRWORA, any treatment by the hospital was uncompensated.56
II. Forced Repatriation: Causes and Costs 
 A single avenue of medical care survived PRWORA’s wholesale 
elimination of benefits for undocumented immigrants: the emergency 
                                                                                                                      
52 8 U.S.C. § 1601(5) (“It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for 
eligibility . . . to assure that aliens be self-reliant.”). The statute claims that the policy re-
flects long-standing, basic principles of U.S. immigration. See id. § 1601(1). But see Knutson, 
supra note 13, at 412 (“Restrictions on immigrant access to public health benefits are a 
relatively recent trend.”). 
53 See § 1601(2) (stating that it is U.S. immigration policy that “the availability of public 
benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States”). At the heart of 
this legislation was an image rooted in the zero-sum paradigm of American health care 
discourse. See Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Healthcare Narrative and What It Tells Us About 
the U.S. Health Care System, 17 Annals Health L. 229, 249 (2008) (arguing that often the 
health care debate in America is based on an assumption that granting access to one per-
son necessarily means depriving someone else). In the 1990s, this discourse was dominated 
by uncorroborated, anecdotal evidence suggesting access to health care benefits incentiv-
izes immigration into the United States. See Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health 
Nightmare: The Anti-Immigrant Provisions of the “Contract with America” Congress, 90 Ky. L.J. 
1043, 1044–45 (2001). “[G]overnment-sponsored services are so far down the list of rea-
sons for immigration to the U.S. that they scarcely arise at all.” Id.; see also Francine J. Lip-
man, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 
9 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2006) (“The widespread belief . . . that ‘illegal aliens’ cost 
more in government services than they contribute to the economy . . . . is demonstrably 
false.”) (citations omitted). 
54 See §§ 1611(a), 1641(b). PRWORA’s narrow definition of eligibility for undocu-
mented immigrants is a significant break with the past. See Costich, supra note 53, at 1046, 
1053–54. Previously, a far more generous standard applied to undocumented immigrants, 
though many were still denied benefits. See id. 
55 See §§ 1611(a), (c)(1)(B), 1621(a), (c)(1)(b). If a state desires to provide unquali-
fied immigrants with state-sponsored benefits, then it may enact laws affirmatively reinstat-
ing their eligibility. See id. § 1621(d). This provision implicitly requires states to take the 
onerous step of reenacting any pre-existing state legislation authorizing state public bene-
fits for unqualified aliens. See id.; Costich, supra note 53, at 1052–53. New York and Mary-
land took the additional step of denying health care services to legal immigrants. Ortega, 
supra note 13, at 191–92. The laws were subsequently invalidated on state and federal con-
stitutional grounds. Id. at 192. 
56 See §§ 1611(a), (c)(1)(b), 1641(b); Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267; Sontag, supra note 4. 
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room.57 Federal law requires hospitals to provide stabilizing medical 
treatment to emergency room patients regardless of their immigration 
status.58 Medicare’s Conditions of Participation prohibit discharging a 
patient in need of post-hospital care unless he or she is transferred to a 
facility capable of meeting his or her medical needs.59 Hospitals, there-
fore, are duty-bound to provide indefinite, uncompensated care to se-
verely injured, uninsured, undocumented immigrants.60 Because pro-
viding that treatment is expensive, forced repatriation is an “attractive 
solution” to this hodgepodge of contradictory duties when a foreign 
facility will accept the transfer.61
A. EMTALA: One Step Forward, One Step Back 
 Domestic patient dumping has been recognized as a national 
problem since the late 1980s.62 Congress attempted to curb this prac-
tice by passing EMTALA.63 Enacted in 1986, EMTALA requires hospi-
tals receiving federal funds to provide emergency medical treatment to 
any individual, regardless of his health care coverage or eligibility for 
public benefit programs.64 This effectively forbids hospitals from alter-
ing care in any way because of a patient’s immigration status.65 Its pur-
pose was “to protect those vulnerable members of society who were suf-
fering from life threatening medical conditions and were the object of 
                                                                                                                      
57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
59 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d) (2008); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to 
Conditions of Participation of Hospitals, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,414, 64,149 (Dec. 13, 1994). 
60 See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(b)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d); 
Ortega, supra note 13, at 193. 
61 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 1131; Wolpin, supra note 3, at 152–53. 
62 See 131 Cong. Rec. 35,813 (1985) (statement of Rep. Stark) (“[A]ll too often, the 
first thing a patient now receives in the emergency room is an examination of their wallet. 
It’s called a wallet biopsy. No money or insurance card in the wallet will often get an emer-
gency patient dumped at the door with a map to the county hospital.”); Laura D. Hermer, 
The Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 J.L. & Pol’y 695, 696 n.9 
(2006) (citing numerous newspaper articles describing incidents of patient dumping).
63 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99–272, § 9121, 
100 Stat. 164, 164–67 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd); 131 Cong. Rec. 35,813–14 
(1985) (statement of Rep. Stark) (arguing in favor of EMTALA’s passage to end patient 
dumping); Svetlana Lebedinski, EMTALA: Treatment of Undocumented Aliens and the Financial 
Burden It Places on Hospitals, 7 J.L. Soc’y 146, 146 (2005); Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Ka-
moie, Finding a Way Through the Hospital Door: The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergen-
cies, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 590, 590 (2003). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b). 
65 See id.; Knutson, supra note 13, at 422. 
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economically-based discrimination.”66 The statute creates two distinct 
legal obligations: First, the hospital must provide “appropriate medical 
screening” when the patient arrives in the emergency department to 
determine whether he is suffering from what the statute defines as an 
“emergency condition.”67 Second, if such a condition exists, the hospi-
tal must then either provide necessary stabilizing treatment or transfer 
the patient to another facility that can provide such treatment.68
 A number of scholars harshly criticize EMTALA for both its sub-
stance and its drafting.69 Its terms have been extensively litigated.70 
Congress’s attempt at ending patient dumping—well intentioned as it 
may have been—was a band-aid solution to a more pervasive problem, 
or in the words of one commentator, “merely an attempt to flatten the 
tip of the uninsured iceberg with the hope that we will forget the loom-
ing bulk below the surface.”71 Although it increased a hospital’s obliga-
tion to provide emergency care, EMTALA did nothing to reduce the 
economic incentive motivating hospitals to dump patients.72 In es-
                                                                                                                      
66 Mark J. Garwin, Immunity in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 23 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1, 37 (1998); see 131 Cong. Rec. 35,814 (1985) (statement of Rep. 
Stark). 
67 See § 1395dd(a). The Act defines the term “emergency medical condition” as: 
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient se-
verity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical at-
tention could reasonably be expected to result in— 
 (i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant 
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
 (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or 
 (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or 
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions— 
 (i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospi-
tal before delivery, or, 
 (ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or 
the unborn child. 
§ 1395(e)(1). 
68 See § 1395dd(b)(1). 
69 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 Jurimetrics J., 
389, 382–96 (1988) (suggesting it would have been better for Congress to have done noth-
ing at all than pass EMTALA); David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past Imper-
fect/Future Shock, 8 Health Matrix 29, 30, 50–56 (1998) (“EMTALA’s flaws far exceed its 
limited virtues. . . . The premise of the statute is silly at best.”). But see Lebedinski, supra 
note 63, at 147 (suggesting EMTALA successfully accomplished Congress’s goal of reduc-
ing patient dumping). 
70 See Mark A. Hall et al., Health Care Law And Ethics 126–27 (7th ed. 2007). 
71 Hall, supra note 69, at 393–96. 
72 See id.; Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA’s 
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186, 1223 (1986) (concluding that more precise statutory lan-
guage and a stronger enforcement mechanism is required to prevent patient dumping). 
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sence, the combination of EMTALA and PROWRA requires hospitals to 
provide and fund medical care for the traumatically injured and unin-
sured.73 It is the cost of this care that drives hospitals to repatriate pa-
tients.74
B. The Cost of Uncompensated Care and Repatriation 
 Treating uninsured patients is expensive; Mr. Jimenez alone cost 
Martin Memorial over one million dollars.75 As such, private hospitals 
have an economic incentive to avoid providing them with treatment 
beyond what is required by statute.76 In 2008, the cost of providing un-
compensated care to the uninsured by hospitals and physicians was ap-
proximately fifty-six billion dollars.77 Funding from the federal gov-
ernment covered about seventy-five percent of that total cost.78 The 
proportion of uncompensated care generated through the treatment 
of undocumented immigrants is uncertain.79
 Martin Memorial received about $80,000 for providing Luis 
Jimenez with emergency treatment, but was left with an unpaid balance 
of over one million dollars.80 This is a recurring problem; in 2008, the 
                                                                                                                      
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, §§ 401(a), 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2261, 
2274 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Ortega, supra note 13, at 195–96. 
74 See Ortega, supra note 13, at 196; Sontag, supra note 4; see also Lebedinski, supra note 
63, at 161 (suggesting the cost of uncompensated care “prompts hospitals to be creative”). 
75 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Ortega, supra note 13, at 
196. 
76 See Treiger, supra note 72, at 1187. “[A] phenomenon known as patient dumping . . . 
occurs when a hospital that is capable of providing the needed medical care (the transfer-
ring hospital) sends a patient to another facility (the receiving hospital) or simply turns 
the patient away because the patient is unable to pay.” Id. at 1186–87 (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
77 Jack Hadley et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Covering 
the Uninsured in 2008: A Detailed Examination of the Current Costs and Sources 
of Payment, and Incremental Costs of Expanding Coverage 66 (2008), http://www. 
kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf. 
78 See id. In 2008, uncompensated care accounted for about two percent of the total 
amount of health care spending in the United States. See id. 
79 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-472, Undocumented Aliens: Questions 
Persist About Their Impact on Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs 21 (2004); Or-
tega, supra note 13, at 194–95. Data used in studying this phenomenon is difficult to collect 
because hospitals usually do not record the immigration statuses of their patients. See U.S. 
Gen. Accounting Office, supra at 8. Even if hospitals were to inquire about a patient’s im-
migration status, undocumented immigrants are unlikely to identify themselves. See id. 
Therefore, any estimate of the proportion of the costs generated by the treatment of un-
documented immigrants is purely speculative. See id. at 8−9. 
80 See Montejo I, 874 So. 2d at 656. 
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hospital was providing uncompensated treatment for at least six other 
severely injured, uninsured immigrants.81 Recently, the hospital was 
investigated for repatriating another brain-injured patient into Mexico 
without approval from the Mexican government.82 In 2002, Florida 
hospitals absorbed more than forty million dollars in uncompensated 
care costs for the treatment of uninsured noncitizens.83
 The cost of uncompensated medical care and federal law’s ellipti-
cal imprecision encourages the forced medical repatriation of acutely 
injured noncitizens.84 Although it is difficult to paint an accurate por-
trait of the number of repatriations occurring each year, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that it is a serious and widespread problem.85 One 
medical center located in Phoenix, Arizona admits repatriating as many 
as ninety-six immigrants a year.86 In 2007, the Mexican consulate han-
dled the medical cases of at least eighty-seven immigrants, most of 
which resulted in repatriation.87 The practice is common enough to 
support several air ambulance companies purporting to have an exper-
tise in providing such services.88 The price of undertaking the repatria-
tion of a patient can be considerable: Martin Memorial spent $30,000 
to charter the plane that returned Luis Jimenez to Guatemala.89 Given 
the cost of repatriating a patient and the number of reported incidents, 
the cost of unreimbursed care provided to undocumented immigrants 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
82 See id. 
83 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 1131. 
84 See Hadley et al. supra note 77, at 66; Ortega, supra note 13, at 195–96; Wolpin, su-
pra note 3, at 152–53. 
85 See Sontag, supra note 4; Sontag, supra note 27 (describing in detail four other cases 
of successful or attempted forced medical repatriations across the United States); see also 
Lebedinski, supra note 63, at 161–62 (suggesting that the cost of uncompensated care has 
lead to the closure of emergency rooms). 
86 See Wolpin, supra note 3, at 152; Sontag, supra note 4. Arizona suffers acutely from 
this problem because it is a border state with low state financing for immigrant health care. 
See Sontag, supra note 27. 
87 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
88 Id.; see, e.g., Mexcare, An Alternative Choice for the Acute Care of Unfunded Latin 
American Nationals, http://www.mexcare.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (offering to “ar-
rang[e] high-quality acute medical treatment in Latin American countries. . . . that meet the 
needs of both hospital administrators and Latin American patients alike”); Aeromed365, 
Global Travel Related Medical Repatriation Service, http://www.aeromed365.com (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2010) (“Aeromed is the leading supplier of travel-related emergency medical 
services including . . . a complete bed-to-bed repatriation service.”). But see Press Release, 
Mexcare, The New York Times Gets it Wrong! (Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with author) (arguing 
that the company does not participate in nonconsensual medical transfers). 
89 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
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must be significant.90 This financial burden was explicitly acknowl-
edged by Congress in 2003 by its allocation of one billion dollars for the 
reimbursement of otherwise uncompensated care provided by hospitals 
to undocumented immigrants.91 Nevertheless, there are alternatives to 
the continual appropriation of federal dollars.92
III. Tort Liability vs. Direct Regulation 
 After Luis Jimenez was repatriated, Montejo filed a tort action 
against Martin Memorial for false imprisonment.93 The jury found in 
favor of the hospital because its actions were not unreasonable under 
the circumstances.94 This verdict casts doubt on tort law’s ability to pre-
vent the forced repatriation of undocumented immigrants.95 The tort 
system is most effective for redressing injuries that fall within traditional 
categories.96 Nevertheless, forced repatriation is a novel dilemma un-
suited to traditional tort law analysis.97 Even if a theory of tort liability is 
pursued, the structure and operation of direct regulation is better 
suited to preventing the forced repatriation of undocumented immi-
grants.98 In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded, 
“There is almost no political question in the United States that is not 
resolved sooner or later into a judicial one.”99 A public forum for civil 
                                                                                                                      
90 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 79, at 21 (noting difficulties in estimat-
ing the cost of treating uninsured non-citizens); Hadley et al., supra note 77, at 66 (estimat-
ing uncompensated medical costs); Douglas, supra note 1, at 1131 (noting that Florida hospi-
tals spent more than forty million dollars in providing uncompensated care for non-citizens); 
Sontag, supra note 4 (reporting that Mr. Jimenez’s repatriation cost $30,000). 
91 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108–173, § 1011, 117 Stat. 2066, 2432 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 
42 U.S.C.); Lebedinski, supra note 63, at 163; Ortega, supra note 13, at 198. 
92 See Ortega, supra note 13, at 203–04; Wolpin, supra note 3, at 155. 
93 See Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr. (Montejo II ), 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006); Jury Verdict, supra note 2, at 1. 
94 See Jury Verdict, supra note 2, at 1; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory 
State, in Tort Law and the Public Interest 84, 100 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); Thomas 
A. Gionis et al., The Intentional Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State Cause of Action to Address 
the Shortcomings of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 52 
Am. U. L. Rev. 173, 299 (2002); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 
13 J. Legal Stud. 357, 358–64, 368–71 (1984); Sontag, supra note 2. 
95 See Jury Verdict, supra note 2, at 1; Sontag, supra note 2. 
96 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 100. 
97 See Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 299–300. 
98 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 81−82, 100; Shavell, supra note 94, at 358–64, 
368–71. 
99 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 257 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2002) (1835). 
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claims provides instrumental and intrinsic social benefits.100 Under 
these particular circumstances, however, direct regulation is a more 
suitable solution for the problem at hand.101
A. Substantive Shortcomings
 The tort system is a field that defies strict definition.102 Simply 
stated, it is “the body of principles that determines when one who suf-
fers personal injuries may shift that loss to another.”103 Though its func-
tion is contested, “[a]ll tort scholars concede that tort law seeks to 
compensate injured parties.”104 Not every injury, however, creates a 
right to compensation.105 Liability is limited by the presence or absence 
of duty, and has a “tripartite” structure encompassing intentional torts, 
negligence, and strict liability.106 If there is no recognized duty between 
the alleged tortfeasor and the injured party, then the loss “must lie 
where it falls” —with the injured party.107
1. Strict Liability
 Based on a traditional strict liability analysis, forced repatriation 
does not create circumstances appropriate for the imposition of liability 
without fault.108 The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists six factors courts 
should consider when determining whether to impose strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities.109 Notions of fairness, economic effi-
                                                                                                                      
100 See Wendy E. Parmet, Populations, Public Health, and the Law 237 (2009) 
(suggesting tort law is a valuable tool for bringing attention to ignored public health issues 
and for the promotion of regulatory action); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 85 (“The 
right of individuals to present their claims to a judge and lay jury is a well-entrenched so-
cial value.”). 
101 See generally Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 81–82, 100; Shavell, supra note 94, at 
358–64, 368–71. 
102 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 1, at 1–5 
(5th ed. 1984). 
103 Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: The Context of the Controversy to Tort Law and the 
Public Interest, supra note 94, at 1, 17. 
104 See Parmet, supra note 100, at 220. 
105 See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225, 1272 (2001). 
106 See id. at 1269, 1272. 
107 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 94 (Little, Brown & Co. 1951) 
(1881); see Grey, supra note 105, at 1272. 
108 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). Strict liability is defined as “li-
ability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally 
protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to 
exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence.” See Keeton et al., supra note 102, 
§ 75, at 534. 
109 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(a)−(f) (1977). 
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ciency, risk-spreading, and deterrence inform this inquiry.110 If no 
party is at fault, and one party benefited economically from the activity 
that created the risk of harm, then that party should bear the burden of 
loss.111 The internalization of costs increases economic efficiency be-
cause the price of a product will reflect the risk of injury.112 It is most 
commonly employed in products liability actions or cases involving 
hazardous activities.113 When compared to hazardous activities and 
products liability—traditional dominion of strict liability—it is evident 
that the forced repatriation of undocumented immigrants is beyond 
the reach of this doctrine.114
2. Negligence
 “[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard estab-
lished by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm.”115 Liability under a theory of negligence is predicated upon the 
defendant owing a duty of care to the plaintiff.116 At common law, nei-
ther hospitals nor physicians are obligated to provide medical care ab-
sent the existence of a physician-patient relationship.117 The “no duty” 
rule absolves hospitals of any obligation to undertake the treatment of 
uninsured patients at common law.118
 Assuming that a treatment relationship exists—as it did in the case 
of Mr. Jimenez—a plaintiff might pursue a theory of medical malprac-
                                                                                                                      
110 See Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 
20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 579, 592–98 (1993). 
111 See id. at 593. 
112 See id. at 595–97 (“Imposing strict liability on . . . manufacturers promotes product 
safety because it creates a financial incentive for manufacturers to find cost-effective ways 
to minimize risks associated with their products.”). 
113 See id. at 592. 
114 See id. 590–603; see also supra note 3 (defining forced repatriation as a non-consensual 
transfer of a patient). 
115 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965). 
116 See Grey, supra note 105, at 1258–59. 
117 See Hall et al., supra note 70, at 113. The physician-patient relationship is essen-
tially contractual. See Castillo v. Emergency Med. Assocs., 372 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A] physician’s duty arises only upon the creation of a physician-patient relationship; 
that relationship springs from a consensual transaction.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding that medical licen-
sure by the state does not require a physician to practice “on other terms than he may 
choose to accept”). This is commonly referred to as the “no duty” rule. See Hall et al., 
supra note 70, at 113. 
118 See Hall et al., supra note 70, at 113. 
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tice if a hospital undertakes his care and then repatriates him.119 The 
physician or hospital has a duty to exercise the same degree of care as 
“a physician in good standing in the same medical specialty in a similar 
community in like circumstances.”120 In this respect, the medical pro-
fession is privileged; as the professional consensus shifts regarding par-
ticular practices, so does the standard of care.121 Repatriation is argua-
bly already a customary medical practice.122 “Although courts have 
been reluctant to view a defendant’s compliance with custom as conclu-
sive evidence of non-negligence, it is still fairly unusual for a court to 
strike down a professional custom as falling short of the standard of 
reasonable care.”123 Medicare’s Conditions of Participation that regu-
late discharge do little to enhance this duty of care.124 Similarly, profes-
sional organizations do not provide significant guidance to physicians 
in this area.125 Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that a claim of 
medical malpractice would prevail for a repatriated patient.126
                                                                                                                      
119 See Keeton et al., supra note 102, § 32, at 187 (stating that the standard of care for 
physicians is that a “doctor must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily 
possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing”); Michelle M. 
Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 645, 654–59 (2001) (noting difficulties presented by a custom-
based standard of care); Sontag, supra note 4 (noting that the hospital provided care for 
Mr. Jimenez). The physician-patient relationship arises where “a patient seeks care, and a 
physician provides the care.” See Hall et al., supra note 70, at 146. 
120 See Mello, supra note 119, at 655. 
121 See Keeton et al., supra note 102, § 32, at 189. 
122 See Wolpin, supra note 3, at 152–53 (reporting that the American Medical Associa-
tion recently commissioned a study to consider this widespread practice); Sontag, supra 
note 4; Sontag, supra note 27 (describing in detail four other cases of successful or at-
tempted forced medical repatriations across the country). 
123 See Mello, supra note 119, at 658. 
124 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d) (2008) (requiring hospitals to transfer patients to an ap-
propriate facility); Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Revisions to Conditions of Participa-
tion of Hospitals, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,141, 64,149 (Dec. 13, 1994)(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 482) 
(providing the official comment interpreting “appropriate facility” broadly as capable of 
meeting the patient’s medical needs, and not providing specific guidelines regarding repa-
triation). 
125 See Wolpin, supra note 3, at 153 (noting that the American Medical Association did 
not adopt a draft resolution condemning forced repatriation, but agreed to study the is-
sue). But see id. (noting that the California Medical Association openly opposes the prac-
tice). 
126 See Keeton et al., supra note 102, § 32, at 187 (discussing the physician’s standard 
of care); Mello, supra note 119, at 654–59 (noting the difficulties presented by a custom-
based standard of care); Sontag, supra note 4 (describing the facts of Luis Jimenez’s case). 
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3. Intentional Torts 
 Like domestic patient dumping, Martin Memorial’s decision to 
return Luis Jimenez to Guatemala can be characterized as an inten-
tional tort.127 Broadly defined, intentional torts are acts committed 
“with the intent to injure the plaintiff or with substantial certainty that 
[the] action would injure the plaintiff.”128 The repatriation of an unin-
sured, undocumented immigrant can be interpreted as an act of eco-
nomic or non-economic discrimination unrelated to a patient’s medical 
care.129 According to some scholars, this kind of discriminatory deci-
sion making “exists in a zone outside the practice of medicine” and 
should be analyzed like an intentional tort.130
 In Montejo, the plaintiff filed a claim for false imprisonment—an 
intentional tort—and failed only on the element of reasonableness.131 
Florida’s definition of false imprisonment includes abduction, but the 
circumstances of forced repatriation do not comport with the standard 
definition of the tort.132 The lack of a clearly recognized cause of action 
is not necessarily fatal; tort law’s “ongoing recognition of legally cogni-
zable rights, duties, interests, and injuries” is well-recognized.133 Not-
withstanding that possibility, tort liability has proven to be an inade-
quate deterrent where an injury falls outside of the traditional category 
of injury.134
                                                                                                                      
127 See Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 180, 300; Sontag, supra note 4. 
128 See Keeton et al., supra note 102, § 8, at 33–39; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of 
Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 447, 
447 (1990). 
129 Compare Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 180, 300–07 (describing the proposed ele-
ments of an intentional tort of patient dumping), with Sontag, supra note 4 (describing the 
facts of Mr. Jimenez’s repatriation). 
130 See Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 180. 
131 See Montejo II, 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Sontag, supra note 2. 
132 See Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a) (2007); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965) 
(defining traditional elements of false imprisonment without abduction); supra note 3 (defin-
ing forced repatriation for purposes of this Comment). 
133 Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 297; see also Keeton et al., supra note 102, § 1, at 4 
(“The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set. . . . 
[T]he mere fact that the claim is novel will not itself operate as a bar to the remedy.”). 
134 See Gionis et al., supra note 94, at 299; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 100. 
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B. The Structural Superiority of Regulation 
1. Ex Ante Regulation vs. Ex Post Liability 
 The fundamental structural distinction between tort liability and 
direct regulation is procedural.135 Statutory rules and regulatory stan-
dards have an immediate effect on the behavior of individuals.136 They 
are public in nature and operate ex ante, independent of the harm 
they are directed at preventing.137 Regulations are uniform and speak 
to all similarly situated potential injurers.138 In contrast, the tort system 
is “backward-looking.”139 It relies on private actors and “works not by 
social command but rather indirectly, through the deterrent effect of 
damage actions that may be brought once harm occurs.”140 These were 
the circumstances in Montejo ; the plaintiff’s personal injury suit was 
brought after Mr. Jimenez’s repatriation seeking damages to cover the 
cost of his care in Guatemala and partially to curb the victimization of 
undocumented immigrants.141
2. Factors Favoring Regulation 
 Whether liability or regulation should be employed to encourage 
particular behavior and prevent injury depends upon the nature of the 
regulated activity.142 Professor Steven Shavell has developed a multi-
factor analysis to determine the relative desirability of these two alter-
natives.143 Applying this analysis to forced repatriation, regulation 
proves to be the most suitable method for preventing harm to un-
documented immigrants.144
                                                                                                                      
135 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 83. 
136 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 357. 
137 See id. 
138 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 84. 
139 See id. at 83. 
140 Shavell, supra note 94, at 357. 
141 See Wolpin, supra note 3, at 154; Sontag, supra note 2. 
142 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 357. Admittedly, these means of controlling behavior 
are not mutually exclusive and may be more effective when acting in concert. Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 94, at 86−94 (discussing different ways in which torts may compli-
ment statutory regulation); Shavell, supra note 94, at 365–66 (discussing the joint use of 
liability and regulation to control conduct). 
143 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 358–64. “Shavell’s underlying assumption is that tort 
law is a regulatory system that should be evaluated in terms of its consequences for the 
efficient control of accidents.” Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 85. 
144 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 83–86, 100; Shavell, supra note 94, at 358–64, 
368–71; Wolpin, supra note 3, at 152–55. 
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 The first factor in this analysis is knowledge about the activity be-
ing regulated.145 This knowledge may include “the benefits of [the] 
activities, the costs of reducing risks, or the probability or severity of the 
risks.”146 Civil liability is preferable when private parties have greater 
access to knowledge of these risks.147 Evaluating the sufficiency of for-
eign facilities for cross-border patient transfers, however, may be a chal-
lenge for individual health care providers.148 Professor Shavell argues 
that rule-making authorities may have better access to or ability to 
evaluate information regarding health or medical-related informa-
tion.149 The public nature of regulation and the private nature of tort 
law are also relevant to this informational factor.150 Where the same 
information about benefits and risks is relevant to many instances of 
harm, regulation’s ability to speak uniformly and universally is an ad-
vantage.151
 A second consideration is the ability of parties to adequately com-
pensate the injured for the harm caused.152 Under a regulatory regime, 
a party’s financial status is largely irrelevant unless significant fines are 
levied for violations.153 The importance of controlling costs cannot be 
overstated in the context of uncompensated health care given the rela-
tively modest budgets of many hospitals.154 Martin Memorial operated 
with a profit margin of just 3.6% in 2007.155 The effect of a plaintiff’s 
verdict in cases like Montejo could be significant for a hospital and could 
harm the delivery of health care to the surrounding population.156
 The third consideration is the plaintiff’s ability to sue.157 If injured 
parties are unlikely or unable to bring suit, then the tort system cannot 
                                                                                                                      
145 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 359. In principle, negligence itself propels parties to 
collect information about due care. See id. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. 
148 See Wolpin, supra note 3, at 154. 
149 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 369. Regulations are preferable where they are based 
on either common sense or complex information; tort liability implicitly holds the middle 
ground. See id. 
150 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 94, at 84. 
151 See id. 
152 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 360. 
153 See id. at 361 n.7. 
154 See Lebedinski, supra note 63, at 161–62 (describing the closure of emergency 
rooms due to the cost of uncompensated care); Sontag, supra note 4 (describing the bur-
den of uncompensated care on Martin Memorial and other hospitals). 
155 See Sontag, supra note 4. 
156 See Lebedinski, supra note 63, at 161−62; Sontag, supra note 4. 
157 See Shavell, supra note 94, at 363. 
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effectively deter harmful conduct.158 The importance of this factor can 
vary given the injured party’s reasons for not pursuing a legal claim.159 
Indigent, undocumented immigrants have the weightiest of reasons: 
“In the United States, there is no general right to state-funded counsel 
in civil proceedings.”160 Luis Jimenez was fortunate enough to have his 
cause championed by a well-established West Palm Beach law firm.161 
The probability or frequency of private lawsuits has no bearing on a 
regulatory regime’s effectiveness.162
 The administrative cost associated with each of these methods is 
the final factor.163 Notwithstanding the many different costs associated 
with litigation, including both private legal fees and public court-
related expenses, the tort system is usually more efficient than regula-
tion in terms of administration.164 Even if the harm is eliminated by 
regulation, statutes must be continually enforced to ensure compliance 
and maintain the regulatory system.165 Where non-compliance is easily 
detected, however, the administrative costs of regulation may be re-
duced.166 The forced repatriation of undocumented immigrants has 
garnered no small amount of national attention.167 Moreover, the prob-
lem has been acknowledged by the professional medical community.168 
Physicians and health care providers are already calling for the gov-
ernment to address the dilemma of repatriation through the existing 
Medicare system by the promulgation of minimum standards for trans-
ferring patients to foreign facilities.169 Considered within Professor 
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Shavell’s analytical framework, direct regulation of forced repatriation 
proves to be the most effective and efficient method for preventing 
harm to undocumented immigrants.170
Conclusion 
 In the words of the attorney representing the interests of Luis 
Jimenez, the forced repatriation of undocumented immigrants “clearly 
cries out for a legislative solution.”171 This shameful practice is the re-
sult of a tangled web of federal regulations standing at the intersection 
of immigration and health care law. EMTALA requires hospitals to pro-
vide emergency medical treatment to all individuals regardless of im-
migration status, and the Medicare Conditions of Participation prohibit 
discharging patients in need of further medical care. Nonetheless, 
Congress terminated access to Medicare and Medicaid for undocu-
mented immigrants by passing PRWORA. Due to a number of socio-
economic factors, virtually no undocumented immigrants are covered 
by private health insurance. Under these circumstances, forced repa-
triation is an attractive solution for cash-strapped hospitals like Martin 
Memorial. The structure and operation of direct regulation, in com-
parison to that of tort law, is better suited to solving this difficult di-
lemma. Accordingly, Congress should heed the call of health care pro-
viders to adopt unambiguous regulations governing the transfer of all 
patients to foreign hospitals. 
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